Description

When, and how, might crises force institutions to change? Crisis management prompts expectations of exceptional behaviour, leaders raising their 'game', and of being empowered. The Greek crisis of 2009-18 was severe: threatening bankruptcy and Greece's exit from the euro. Yet, in a previous study of 2015, Featherstone and Papadimitriou identified key institutional weaknesses embedded within Greek governments: of poor central control and coordination, the very qualities needed in a crisis. So, how far did the crisis in Greece enable actors to overcome these critical weaknesses? What lessons were drawn, and when?

Exploring change in a crisis requires careful case study. Drawing on interviews with an extensive range of personnel, including each crisis Greek prime minister, the authors meticulously explore how the four prime ministers of the period handled the challenges of crisis management. In doing so, they apply an original analytical frame.

They then place the Greek case in a wider, comparative perspective, contributing to studies of crisis leadership, crisis management, core executives, and the utility of external loan conditionality. There are implications for the capacity to reform in particular domestic settings and the ability of external actors like the European Union to leverage such reform. In a heterogeneous Europe, these are issues of likely continuing importance.