Description

The Self in Question offers a humanistic account of self-consciousness and personal identity, providing a much-needed rapprochement between Analytic and Phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness. In Analytic philosophy, a resurgence of interest in the topic of self-consciousness has been inspired by the work of Gareth Evans. Both Evans and his successors make the plausible assumption that self-consciousness is a capacity manifested in the use of "I", or through behaviour which must be described in terms of "I". The Self in Question develops this assumption through an analysis of Wittgenstein's insights into "I"-as-subject and self-identification, relating them - as their author did not - to the epistemology of memory and bodily awareness. As a result, it is able to discern the truth in the apparently discredited memory criterion of personal identity. It also draws on Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the body's significance for self-consciousness, to offer a critique of materialism about the body.